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Abstract 
 
Arthur’s (1988) model for competing technologies is discussed from the perspective of 
evolution theory.  Using Arthur’s own model for the simulation, we show that ‘lock-ins’ can be 
suppressed by adding reflexivity or uncertainty on the side of consumers.  Competing 
technologies then tend to remain in competition.  From an evolutionary perspective, lock-ins 
and prevailing equilibrium can be considered as different trajectories of the techno-economic 
systems under study.   
 Our simulation results suggest that technological developments which affect the natural 
preferences of consumers do not induce changes in trajectory, while changes in network 
parameters of a technology sometimes induce ordered substitution processes.  These substitu-
tion processes have been shown empirically (e.g., Fisher & Prey, 1971), but hitherto they have 
been insufficiently understood from the perspective of evolutionary modelling.  Implications for 
technology policies are discussed. 
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Arthur’s (1988) model 
 
Arthur generalized his model from so-called P\lya-urn models for the purpose of studying 
economic processes like standardization, network effects, and so-called ‘increasing returns’ 
(David, 1985).  As in the case of path-dependency in the probabilities of drawings in urn 
models, one can assume that how previous adopters have chosen from among competing 
technologies will matter for individual consumers (cf. Leydesdorff 1992 and 1995). 
 The two competing technologies are labeled A and B.  These are cross-tabled with two 
types of agents, R and S, with different ‘natural inclinations’ towards A and B.  In Table 1, aR 
represents the natural inclination of R-agents towards type A technology, and bR a (lower) 
inclination towards B.  Similarly, one can attribute parameters aS and bS to S-agents (bS > aS). 
 
  Technology A  Technology B 
 R-agent  aR + rnA  bR + rnB 
 S-agent  aS + snA  bS + snB 
 
 Table 1.  Returns to adopting A or B, given nA and nB previous adopters of A and B.  
 (The model assumes that aR > bR and that bS > aS. Both r and s are positive.) 
 
The network effects are modelled as independent terms, again differently for R-type agents and 
S-type agents.  The appeal of a technology is increased by previous adopters with a term r 
(lower case) for each R-type agents, and s for S-type agents.  If R-type and S-type agents arrive 
on the market randomly, the theory of random walks predicts that this competition will 
necessarily lock-in on either side (A or B). 
  
 
Figure 1 shows the results of ten runs in a population of 10,000 adopters with parameter values 
0.8 for aR and bS, 0.2 for aS and bR, and 0.01 for r and s.  The line in the middle corresponds to a 
50% market share for each technology.  As predicted, lock-in occurs in all cases, although not 
necessarily before the end of this simulation using 10,000 adopters. 
 The network effects are generated 
endogenously as a consequence of the values of 
parameters r and s.  If we reduce these two 
parameters with 50% to 0.005 in the above 
model, lock-in will often not occur in a popula-
tion of this size (10,000).  The absorbing 
barriers are not caused by (static) market condi-
tions, but structural in a random walk with 
path-dependent feedback. 
 
Technological leap-frogging 
 
Is a technology that has lost out in the 
competition for lock-in able to leap-frog back 
in at a later date?  Let us, for example, assume  
that a technological breakthrough is achieved in technology B after a lock-in in technology A.  If 
the market is sufficiently large ((nA + nB) > 2000), it can become attractive to the suppliers of 
technology B to invest in recapturing this market.  The breakthrough is modelled in the next 
program given this market size and the condition that technology A has become dominant to the 
extent of capturing two-thirds of the market.  
What are the chances for technology B? 
 The technological breakthrough first 
operates on intrinsic inclinations because it 
changes the functional characteristics of the 
technology (for example, the price/performance 
ratio), and only upon diffusion can there be a 
network effect.  These network effects will be 
discussed in a later section.   
 The breakthrough in technology B is 
simulated here by resetting the ‘natural inclin-
ation’ towards technology B for R-type adopters 
to 2.0 (instead of 0.2 before), while their ‘natu-
ral inclination’ for technology A is reduced to 
0.08 (versus 0.8 before).  Analogously, the 
natural inclination of S-type adopters towards 
technology A is reduced with an order of magnitude to 0.02, and the inclination to the already 
preferred technology B is increased to 8.0.  The lock-ins are never affected by these dramatic 
changes in the parameters.  Results are similar to those in Figure 1.  Thus, a lock-in prevents 
technological leap-frogging of a superior technology after the fact.   
 
If we increase and decrease all relevant parameters with yet another order of magnitude, we 
force a reversal of the lock-in that we shall call a ‘lock-out’.  Interestingly enough, an in-
between trajectory is visible when the market is sufficiently large.  The system then returns to 
equilibrium instead of overshooting into a lock-in of technology B (Figure 2; based on 20,000 
 
Figure 1 time 6 
Arthur’s model as specified in Table 1; after 10 
simulation runs 
 
Figure 2 time 6 
Technological ‘lock-out’ and possible return to 
equilibrium (20,000 adopters) 
  
adopters). 
Uncertainty about relative market shares 
 
In general, lock-in into technology A occurs when it has become more attractive for S-agents to 
buy this technology, despite their natural preference for technology B.  From Table 1, we can 
learn that this is the case when: 
 
 aS + snA > bS + snB 
thus: 
 snA - snB > bS - aS 
 (nA - nB) > (bS - aS)/s 
 
In short: given the values for various parame-
ters in the model, the lock-in depends only on 
the difference between the numbers of previous 
adopters |nA - nB|.  When this difference sur-
passes a critical value, the system is locked-in.  
However, with increasing diffusion, the 
difference (nA - nB) becomes smaller as a per-
centage of the market. 
 This relative decrease of the percentage 
has an economic interpretation.  While consumers 
may be able to distinguish large differences in adoption between two technologies, decreasingly 
smaller percentages may become difficult to perceive.  Let us, for example, assume that 
consumers can appreciate the difference in market penetration of technologies A and B as long 
as this difference is larger than 5% of the market.  When the difference becomes smaller than 
5%, adopters become uncertain, and we assume that they hold to their ‘natural inclination’ under 
this condition.  Figure 3 illustrates that lock-ins virtually disappear in this case. 
 
Reflexivity on the side of consumers 
 
The Arthur-models assume that adopters are able to efficiently calculate their own net profits, 
and make decisions that follow market forces.  However, people have a tendency to keep to 
their preferences even if they have to pay a price for them.  In this section, we assume that 
switching to a technology other than the one ‘naturally’ prefered, can only be induced by the 
expectation of a net profit of 5% or larger.  Thus, consumers will estimate their profits reflexive-
ly, and no longer react immediately to marginal profits. 
 The results of ten rounds of simulation under these conditions are similar to those in 
Figure 3.  The lock-ins tend to disappear; they can occur incidentally as a consequence of the 
swings in market shares before equilibrium is achieved. 
 
‘Lock-out’ because of changes in diffusion parameters 
 
If, under the conditions specified above where technology A has captured two-thirds of a market 
with more than 2000 adopters, the network effect r (associated to R, and therefore with a 
preference for A) is reduced with three orders of magnitude, and the network effect s is 
increased with a factor thousand, the lock-ins are not affected.  Thus, this system is robust 
against dramatic changes in diffusion effects. 
 
Figure 3 time 6 
Uncertainty about a difference smaller than 5% leads 
to suppression of the lock-in in nine out of ten cases 
  
However, if s vanishes at these conditions (s = 
0) so that network effects disappear for S-type 
agents, equilibrium tends to be restored (Figure 
4).  This is an analytical consequence of the 
model specified in Table 1.  Thus, after the fact 
of a lock-in one should invest in technologies 
that counter-act on network externalities rather 
than on technological breakthroughs that affect 
natural inclinations. 
 
 
Locked-in versus Locking-in 
 
These results raise the question whether 
network  externalities  should  be  attributed  to  
choices by previous adopters or to the technologies involved.  If  we associate r (along the 
column in Table 1) with technology A, and correspondingly s with technology B, we obtain a 
model that is highly sensitive to changes in both s and r.  For example, if the network effect r is 
reduced by only 50% (to 0.005) under the conditions above%where technology A has captured 
two-thirds of a market with more than 2000 adopters%the lock-ins for technology A 
instantaneously revert into lock-ins for technology B.  
 Interestingly enough, not only a decrease in r leads to this effect, but also an increase in 
s, that is, if the network effects of the non-dominant technology are gradually strengthened, for 
example, because of generational drift in the population.  Thus, the lock-out in this case is an 
effect of changes in the network parameters of the technology which at that moment is no 
longer being traded.  S-type agents (which arrive randomly) change their purchasing behaviour, 
and thereby force a change in lock-in. 
 Restoration of equilibrium can in this 
case not be achieved by changing the network 
parameters of technologies.  One needs a third 
mechanism like uncertainty among adopters to 
induce a return to equilibrium.  For example, if 
we combine the last simulation with the above 
condition of keeping to one’s original prefer-
ence when the difference in market share is less 
than 5% (given a market of 10,000 adopters),1 
the system obtains a window for returning to 
equilibrium.  This is demonstrated in Figure 5 
for a population of 30,000.  
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
Lock-ins can be considered as discrete long-term expectations of network effects.  Selections at 
the network level are a consequence of the relational factors in the variation.  If one assumes 
that adopters have a reflexive capacity to estimate uncertainties, categorical lock-ins tend to 
disappear in the simulations in favour of a long-term trajectory of competitive equilibrium.  A 
                                                 
     
1
 This rise of the threshold in number of adopters for making uncertainty relevant is necessary, since otherwise 
almost no lock-ins occur (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 4 time 6 
S-type agents do no longer profit from the network 
externalities (s = 0) 
 
Figure 5 time 6 
Lock-in, lock-out and return to equilibrium in a 
population of 30,000 adopters 
  
co-evolution between competing technologies may not be exceptional in view of the prevailing 
reflexivity and uncertainty at the actor level. 
 Our simulations show that trajectory transitions can be induced by changing network 
parameters.  In this model the emergence of a new technology affecting the natural inclinations 
of consumers does not lead to a transition if there is already a lock-in.  In their study of hyper-
selection in innovation processes, Bruckner et al. (1994) showed that only within niches can the 
separatrix between the two basins of attraction sometimes be tunneled given a stochastic model. 
 This conclusion accords with our results: if sufficiently present, network parameters become 
dominant (cf. Leydesdorff 1994). 
 Furthermore, we could show that infrastructural changes can sometimes lead to ordered 
substitution processes, notably following the lock-in line of the substituting technology.  
Although they have been demonstrated empirically (e.g., Fisher & Prey, 1971), substitution 
processes have been insufficiently understood from the perspective of evolutionary modelling. 
Not the emergence of a new technology, but structural adjustments in the dynamics of the 
network seem to determine the dissolution of one lock-in or another given a choice between 
competing technologies (cf. Freeman & Perez, 1988; David & Foray, 1994). 
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